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TESTIMONY OF 
LISA HEINZERLING 
PROFESSOR OF LAW 
GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY LAW CENTER 
BEFORE THE SUBCOMMIITEE ON 
ENERGY POLICY, NATURAL RESOURCES AND 
REGULATORY AFFAIRS 
COMMIITEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM 
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 
MARCH 12, 2002 
My name is Lisa Heinzerling. I am a Professor of Law at the 
Georgetown University Law Center. I have also taught at the Harvard and 
Yale Law Schools. I am a graduate of the University of Chicago Law 
School, where I served as editor-in-chief of the Uni'/ersity of Chicago Law 
Review. After law school I clerked for Judge Richard Posner on the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, and then for Justice William 
Brennan of the U.S. Supreme Court: I was an Assistant Attorney General in 
the Environmental Protection Division of the Massachusetts Attorney 
General's Office for several years before coming to Georgetown in 1993. 
My expertise is in environmental and administrative law. 
In December 200 I, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) 
issued a report entitled "Making Sense of Regulation: 2001 Report to 
Congress on the Costs and Benefits of Regulations and Unfunded Mandates 
on State, Local, and Tribal Entities" [hereinafter 2001 OMB Report). At the 
request of the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA), I 
served as a peer reviewer of the 200 10MB Report. In January 2002, OMB 
issued a document entitled "Analytical Perspectives," accompanying the 
White House's budget for fiscal year 2002 [hereinafter Analytical 
Perspectives). 
Together, these documents provide troubling insights into OIRA's 
deregulatory agenda. 
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There are five large problems with the 200 I OMS Report and 
Analytical Perspectives document: 
I. The 2001 OMS Report contains a regulatory "hit list" which appears 
to reflect nothing other than an unprincipled response to the behind-
the-scenes lobbying efforts ofpolilically powerful industries. 
2. The Report reveals OIRA's intention to intrude upon the decision-
making prerogatives of the administrative agencies in such a way as to 
promote unwarranted delay of and meddling with the agencies' work. 
3. The Report contains highly misleading, outdated, and inaccurate 
estimates of the costs and benefits of federal regulation, particularly 
environmental regulation. 
4. The Report and Analytical Perspectives document together threaten to 
increase the executive branch's problematic reliance on cost-benefit 
analysis as a way of evaluating the wisdom of regulatory policy. 
5. The AnalYtical Perspectives document serves notice that OIRA also 
intends to evaluate agency decision making through use of a 
methodology, cost-effectiveness analysis, which in OIRA's hands will 
treat health, safety, and environmental measures that protect future 
generations, the elderly, and the sick as less worthwhile than those 
that protect the present generation, the young, and the healthy. 
My testimony is divided into five parts, corresponding to the five problems 
noted above. In brief, my testimony shall suggest that OIRA's newly 
aggressive posture with respect to the administrative agencies, coupled with 
its growing use of cost-benefit and cost-effectiveness analysis to criticize 
agency decisions, threatens to delay or to undermine a good deal of 
important federal regulation, especially health, safety, and environmental 
regulation. Especially where this office is headed, as it now is, by someone 
who regards the precautionary principle underlying many of our health, 
safety, and environmental protections as "a mythical concept, perhaps like a 
unicorn" (John D. Graham, "The Role of Precaution in Risk Assessment and 
Management: An American's View" (Jan. 11-12, 2002). available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omblinforeg/eu_speech.html), OIRA's new 
assertiveness may presage a rocky time for health, safety, and environmental 
protection in this country. 
2 
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I. THE REGULAYO~Y HIT LIST 
This year, OIR \ has turned the report on the costs and benefits of 
federal regulation into an opportunity for regulated industry to roll back 
regulations it does not like, in the guise of promoting neutral principles like 
good science and economic efficiency. 
In Appendix A to the 2001 OMB Report, OIRA lists suggestions from 
the "public" for refoml of 71 federal regulations. These suggestions were 
offered by entities directly regulated by the rules in question and by groups 
funded by such entities. For example, the Mercatus Center at George Mason 
University - historically funded by, among others, Enron, International 
Paper, the American Chemistry Council, and David Koch, Executive Vice-
President and member of the board of directors of Koch Industries, a 
company with interests in refining, asphalt, natural gas, gas liquids, 
chemicals, plastics, chemical technology equipment, minerals, fertilizers, 
ranching, and financial businesses (see http://www.kochind.com) -
submitted 44 of the 71 proposals for refonn. 
In response to these self-interested suggestions, OIRA prioritized the 
proposals by giving them a ranking of I, 2, or 3, with I reflecting the 
highest·priority items. Twenty-three regulations were ranked I, "high 
priority" (2001 OMB Report at p. 62). Following its consideration of the 
high-priority proposals, OJRA stated, "a 'prompt letter' may be crafted and 
sent to the responsible agency for deliberation and response" (200 J OMB 
Report at p. 62). 
Thus has OMB's report on the costs and benefits of federal regulation 
been tume4 into a backdoor channel for regulated entities to try- to rid 
themselves of regulations they do not like. In its report, OIRA did not 
mention that, as a peer reviewer of the report, I had encouraged OIRA to 
explain how it had arrived at the rankings of rules presented in Appendix A; 
much less did it respond to this suggestion by actually explaining how the 
priorities were set. This silence, combined with contemporaneous news 
accounts reporting that OIRA's director, Jo1m Graham, had asked a staff 
member of this Subconunittee "'to convene key lobbyists to identify and 
rank' regulations that business groups found overly burdensome" 
(Washington Post, Dec. 4, 2001, "Business Lobbyists Asked To Discuss 
3 
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Onerous Rules"), leaves the unmistakable and troubling impression that the 
''high priority" items reflect nothing other than power politics. 
Consideration of a sampling of OIRA's choices in developing its hit 
list confirms this impression. For example, the Environmental Protection 
Agency's decision to strengthen the standard for arsenic in drinking water 
was given a priority of 1 on OIRA's list (2001 OMB Report, Table 7, pp. 
63-64). Only two months before, President Bush's EPA had decided, with 
great fanfare, to retain the Clinton-era standard for arsenic in drinking water. 
EPA had done so after eight months of inquiry into, the science and 
economics of the standard, including cons'deration of new reports by three 
different expert panels, including a report prepared by the National Academy 
of Sciences. In response to this expert assistance, EPA chose to retain the 
Clinton-era standard. Less than two months later, by labeling the arsenic 
standard priority "I," OIRA signaled an intent to revisit the standard once 
again - with no explanation as to its reasons for deeming this rule high 
priority. Although OIRA now has apparently decided not to challenge 
EPA's new arsenic rule (OIRA's web page indicates that its review of the 
standard is now complete), its willingness to revisit the rule, which was fresh 
from a resource-intensive, in-depth review by three expert panels, suggests 
that the refonn priorities set by the 200 1 OMB Report were based on 
something other than the best science or sound economics. 
Similarly, OIRA has labeled review of the Clean Air Act's "New 
Source Review" program "high priority" without explaining why this 
program merits review and possibly reform (2001 OMB Report at p. 102). 
Other programs targeted by industry or industry-backed commentators -
such as EPA's "Tier 2" program for new automobiles and its heavy-duty 
diesel engine rule - were not given high priority status by OIRA even 
though they embody the same basic kind of regulatory regime (based on a 
requirement that new sources of air pollution use the best available pollution 
control technology) as New Source Review. This is not to say that OIRA 
should have revisited the programs regulating automobiles and trucks. It is 
to say, however, that no principled basis for distinguishing the programs on 
OIRA's hit list from the programs not included there emerges from the 2001 
OMB Report. Once again, it is tempting to conclude that lobbying power, 
not neutral principles, guided OIRA's priority-setting process. 
For further evidence of this possibility, note that EPA's "CAFO Rule" 
(pertaining to regulation of water pollution from concentrated animal 
4 
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feeding operations) made it onto OIRA's regulatory hit list (see 2001 OMB 
Report at 64) one month after representatives of the agricultural industry met 
with top-level OIRA officials. (See meeting record available at 
htto://www.whjtehoyse.goy/omb/oira/2040/meetjngSt81.html.) In the 
absence of any eXillanation for the priorities reflected on OIRA's hit list, an 
interested member of the public might be excused for interpreting this 
sequence of events as evidence of the lobbying prowess of agricultural I 
interests. 
In sum, OlRA has begun to use its report on the costs and benefits of 
federal regulation as a vehicle for undoing or at least revisiting agency 
decisions, without providing the interested citizen with any basis for 
pmiicting which agency rules will make the hit list and which will not. 
Thus the report - which, ironically, has been required in the name of the 
public's "right to know" - threatens to become a backdoor channel to 
deregulation. 
I 
II. DELAY AND MEDDUNG: THE RETURN OF THE RETURN LEITER 
In the 2001 OMB Report, OIRA announces the "return of the 'return 
letter'" (p. 39). OIRA asserts that it may issue a ''return letter," seeking 
further justification for or modification of an agency proposal, in the 
following circumstances (pp. 39-40): 
• inadequate analysis; 
• th~ ''regulatory standards adopted are not justified by the analyses"; 
• the rule is not consistent with the principles announced in E.O. 12866 
or with "the President's policies and priorities"; or 
• the rule is ''not compatib.le with other Executive Orders or statutes." 
There are several problems with OIRA's assertion of authority over 
agency decision-making. First, many statutes establish standard-setting 
principles that are themselves "not consistent with the principles annolDlced 
in E.O. 12866." For example, the Clean Air Act's National Ambient Air 
Quality Standards are to be set without regard to economic costs. See 
Whitman v. American Truclring Assns., 531 U.S. 457 (2001). In its report, 
OIRA concedes that it "sht,.,LIld not return a rule to an agency for reasons that 
s 
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would compel an agency to act in ways that are inconsistent or incompatible 
with the statute under which the agency is operating" (2001 OMB Report at 
p.4O). However, OIRA's actual behavior gives reason to fear that the return 
letter may be used as a way to undennine statutory requirements OIRA does 
not like. 
I For example, as noted above, OIRA has given "high priority" status to 
EPA's New Source Review program, in response to the Mercatus Center's 
proposal that EPA "use the settlement process [in ongoing litigation against 
pollution sources accused of violating the law] to alter its NSR policy" 
(2001 OMB Report at p. 102). The Mercatus Center also criticized "EPA's 
aggressive application" of the New Source Review program (ibid.). 
However, the Department of Justice has concluded, after a thorough study of 
the matter, that "EPA may reasonably conclude that the enforcement actions 
are consistent with the Clean Air Act and its regulations." (See United 
States Department of Justice, Office of Legal Policy, "New Source Review: 
An Analysis of the Consistency of Enforcement Actions with the Clean Air 
Act and Implementing Regulations," at iv (Jan. 2002).) It is hard to square 
OIRA's announced intention to review the New Source Review program and 
pending enforcement efforts undertaken pursuant to it with OIRA's assertion 
that it will respect existing statutory requirements in reviewing regulatory 
programs. 
A second basic problem with OIRA's announced intentions 
concerning return letters is thaI OIRA has no legal power to announce 
authoritative constructions of statutes; that is, instead, the job of regulatory 
agencies where their statutory commands are ambiguous. In reviewing 
agency decisions for consistency with E.O. 12866, with the President's 
"policies and priorities," and with other statutes and Executive Orders, 
OIRA may not tell an agency charged with implementing a partiCUlar statute 
how to construe that statute. OIRA's description of the grounds for return 
letters remains ambiguous as to whether OIRA intends to return regulatory 
proposals to agencies on the basis of disputes over statutory interpretation; 
OIRA does not explicitly say that it will respect agencies' interpretations of 
the statutes they are charged with administering. 
A third problem with OIRA's policy on return letters is that agencies 
are bound to follow the instructions of Congress even where these 
instructions may collide with the President's current "policies and 
priorities." OIRA may not interfere with agency action that is consistent 
6 
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with the statute under which the agency operates simply on the ground that 
the President does not like the policies embodied in Congressional 
instructions. . 
It may well be, for example, that this Administration considers energy 
conservation to be only "a sign of personal virtue" rather than a requirement 
of law, but the Administration nevertheless has a duty to execute laws 
instructing agencies to set standards for energy efficiency. Once again, the 
200 10MB Report does not instill hope in this regard: the Department of 
Energy's energy conservation standards for central air conditioners and heat 
pumps are on OIRA's hit list (2001 OMB Report at p. 68). 
. A fourth problem with OIRA's aggressive use of return letters is that 
the office's traditional emphasis on conventional economic analysis and the 
predominantly economic training and experience of its staff might lead 
OIRA to disapprove of an agency decision simply because that decision 
departs from a tenet of conventional economics. But this would not 
demonstrate that the agency's actions were unjustified by its analysis; it 
would only prove that the agency's analysiS rests on a different intellectual 
framework (a framework often based on an explicit charge from Congress). 
Although OIRA concedes that it "should be careful not to intrude too far into 
the agency's sphere of expertise and outside of our area of expertise" and 
that "it will not always be feasible for any agency to fully quantify and 
monetize benefits and costs" (2001 OMB Report at p. 40), its actual 
behavior again belies its expressions of deference to expert agencies. 
Indeed. it appears that OIRA is insisting upon quantification and 
monetization of regulatory benefits even where the relevant agency has 
concluded that quantification and monetization are either not possible or not 
necessary. This insistence on waiting for "the numbers" will, at the least, 
inappropriately delay agency action, and it may even stop many good rules 
in their tracks. 
. Three examples serve to justify this concern. First, OIRA has 
responded to a proposal by EPA to regulate "non-road" engines (such as 
boats, snowmobiles, fork lifts, and the like) by questioning EPA's 
conclusion that the savings in fuel costs alone that would be inspired by the 
rule justified the rule's costs. In so questioning EPA's conclusion, OIRA 
expressed skepticism that regulation could produce consumer savings where 
the market had not. (See 
http://www.whitehouse.goy/ombljnforeg/spark engines epa se.p200J .html.) 
7 
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Yet EPA had amply documented the fuel efficiency gains (and thus fuel cost 
savings) that its rule would produce. (See EPA, Control of Emissions from 
Nonroad Large Spark Ignition Engines and Recreational Engines (Marine 
and Land-Based); Proposed Rule, 66 Fed. Reg. 51098, 511 69-5 1171 (Oct. 
2001).) In this case, it appears that OIRA's pre-analytic faith in market 
processes caused it to question the empirical analysis of an expert 
administrative agency. OIRA's response to EPA's claims of cost savin~;; 
resembles nothing so much as the old joke about the economist who, 'Jpon 
seeing a IO-dollar bill in the street, refuses to pick it up on the ground ~h!.lt if 
it were really a 10-dollar bill, someone else already would have taken it. 
Moreover, in the same post-review letter regarding the regulation of 
non-road engines. OIRA directs EPA to "make every effort to quantify and 
monetize all the benefits of the proposed rules." (See 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg/spark engines epa sep200I.htrnl.) 
However, the task of quantifying -let alone monetizing - the kinds of health 
effects caused by the air pollution at issue in this proposal is staggering. If 
OIRA intends to try to hold up environmentally protective rules until 
quantification and monetization are both possible and plausible, such rules 
may not be issued for many years. 
In a second example of OIRA's meddling with agency decision 
making, OIRA has presumed to tell EPA bow it should review and develop 
national air quality standards under the Clean Air Act. Although, as noted 
above, the Clean Air Act forbids EPA to take costs into account in setting 
these standards (Whitman v. American Trucking Assns., 531 U.S. 457 
(2001», OIRA has nevertheless seen fit 10 direct EPA to conduct its 
scientific analysis of the health and welfare effects of air pollution in such a 
way as to facilitate OIRA's economic analysis of air pollution regulations. 
(See prompt letter available at 
http://www.whitehouse.govlomb/inforeglepa..pm_research..prompt 12040 l.h 
tmt.) This directive to EPA not only threatens to distort the statutory 
framework under which EPA operates, but also inappropriately threatens to 
put EPA's scientists in the position ofhandrnaidens to OIRA's economists. 
A third and final cautionary example comes from a return letter to 
EPA dated October 2,2001, discussing EPA's proposal to set federal water 
quality standards for Indian country. In this letter, OIRA criticizes EPA tor 
failing to quantify costs and benefits. (See 
bttp:llwww.whitehouse.gQvlomb/inforeglepa water Quality rtn1tr.html.) But 
8 
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the Clean Water Act, pursuant to which EPA's proposal was made, does not 
require this kind of quantification in establish\ng _ ~ater quality standards. 
(See 33 U.S.C: § 13J3(c)(2)(A) (discussing criteria for setting water quality 
standards).) Moreover, a fundamental premise of the Clean Water Act was 
that water pollution control ought not await quantification of the costs and 
benefits of such control. Here again, OIRA's insistence on quantification 
both threatens to delay important agency rules and to undermine the 
statutory frameworks under which the ag"ncies operate. 
It is too early to tell exactly what effecLOlRA's new assertiveness in 
judging agency action will have on the shape and scope of federal 
regulations designed to protect health, safety, and the environment. The 
early evidence, however, is not reassuring. 
III. OIRA's MISTAKEN EsTIMATES OF THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF 
ENVIROm-ENTAL REGULATION 
In the 200 J OMB Report, OMB estimates both the aggregate costs 
and benefits of federal regulations (Tables 1 and 2, p. J I) and the costs and 
benefits for specific rules issued in 1999-2000 (Table 4, pp. 22-29). 
OIRA's aggregate estimates of the costs and benefits of 
environmental regulation are based on obsolete, inaccurate, and conflicting 
data. In particular, lower-bound estimates of benefits are drawn from a 1991 
study, which in tum relied on analyses published in 1978 and 1979 for key 
categories of benefits. Thus, OIRA's estimates inevitably overlook the 
benefits of regulations adopted in the last 20 years, as well as the substantial 
advances in the measurement and analysis of regulatory benefits that have 
occurred in those years. 
To be specific, Table 2 unreasonably credits the possibility that, as of 
1999, environmental regulation had produced no net benefits and, indeed, 
had produced substantial net costs on the order oU73 billion. 
In presenting this striking and implausible (mding, OIRA relies 
heavily on a 1991 study by Robert Hahn and John Hird. (See Robert W. 
Hahn & John A. Hird, The Costs and Benefits of Regulation: Review and 
Synthesis, 8 Yale J. on Reg. 233 (1990) [hereinafter ''Hahn & Hird"]. 
Previous OMB reports provide citations for the estimates found in this year's 
report.) The Hahn and Hird study is too outdated to be of present utility: 
9 
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most of the data on which the Hahn and Hird study was based are two 
decades old. For air pollution. the lower-bound benefits incorporated in 
Table 2 are from a single year, more than twenty years ago - 1978. (See 
Paul R. Portney, Air Potlution Policy, in PiiblicPOliCiesIor Environmental 
Protection, at 57 Table 3-5 (Paul R. Portney ed., 1990) [hereinafter 
"Portney"].) Thus they do not reflect the enonnous amount of information 
that has been developed in the last two decades concerning the adverse 
effects of air pollution on human health and the environment. They do not 
reflect the scientific literature finding an association between e"posure to 
particulate matter and mortality - the very literature on which EPA has 
relied, in a retrospective study on the costs and benefits of the Clean Air Act, 
in finding enonnous benefits in air pollution control. They also do not 
reflect findings over the last two decades on the adverse human and 
ecological effects of acid rain, ozone, and lead. The data regarding water 
pollution control benefits are also obsolete. The basic data come from a 
study performed by Myrick Freeman in 1979. (See Myrick Freeman III, 
Water Pollution Policy, in Public Policies for Environmelltal Protection, at 
147 n. 28 (Paul R. Portney ed., 1990) [hereinafter "Freeman"].} 
In addition, there is good reason to believe that the lower-bound 
estimate of benefits provided in the Hahn and Hird study, and implicitly 
incorporated in Table 2 of this report, dramatically understates the benefits 
of environmental regUlation. Yet that lower-bound estimate is the only 
estimate that makes it possible for OlRA to speculate that environmental 
regulation might have produced negative net benefits as of 1999. Hahn and 
Hird's underlying data on the benefits of air pollution control reflect a value 
of a statistical life of S 1 million, a value that is exceedingly low by current 
standards. (See Portney at 56.) ·This value had a significant effect on the 
results: three-quarters of the benefits reported in the study on which Hahn 
and Hird relied were human health benefits. (See Hahn & Hird at 273.) 
Moreover, OlRA's lower-bound estimate of the benefits of environmental 
regulation (again, incorporated implicitly in Table 2 of this year's report) 
reflects one researcher's own lower-bound estimate of the benefits of air 
pollution control. (See Portney at 55,) This estimate generally reflected 
studies finding "little or no pollution damage to health, vegetation, and the 
like," (Ibid.) OIRA's lower-bound benefits estimate, in other words, 
embodies an assumption that air polIution causes little or no damage to 
humans and the environment. In estimating the benefits of air pollution 
control, this researcher also considered only actual improvements in air 
quality between 1970 and 1978, and thus he did not account for benefits 
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from preventing the degradation of air quality (nor, of course, for changes 
since 1978). As for the benefits of water pollution control, OIRA again 
chooses to rely (implicitly, again, in Table 2) on this same researcher's 
outdated lower-bound estimate. 
Turning to the cost side of the ledger, OJRA continues to rely on Halm 
and Hird, although no longer tilting so strongly toward their lower-bound 
estimates. Hahn and Hird's cost estimates are also problematic. Hahn and 
Hird obtained these estimates from a 1990 study by Michael Hazilta and 
Raymond Kopp. (See Halm & Hird at 272, citing Michael Hazilla & 
Raymond J. Kopp, Social Cost of Environmental Quality RegulatiOns: A 
General EqUilibrium AnalysiS, 98 J. Polir. Econ. 853 (1990).) OIRA 
implicitly relies upon the higher of Hazilla and Kopp's pairs of estimates for 
both 1981 and 1985, although these estimates relied on different 
methodologies. In Table 2, OIRA also implicitly relies upon an EPA cost 
estimate of $54 billion. (lbis estimate is presented in Table I of the 2000 
Report, one of the three sources for Table 2 in this year's report.) This 
estimate is obtained from EPA's 1990 report, "Environmental Investments: 
The Cost of a Clean Environment" ("Cost of Clean"), and EPA's Section 
812 Retrospective on the costs and benefits of the Clean Air Act. OIRA did 
not make sure that the costs of water pollution control programs were not 
included in Table 2 unless their benefits were also reflected therein. Hahn 
and Hird's data on the benefits of water pollution control, for example, do 
not include the benefits of control of toxic water pollutants, whereas the 
costs of this program are provided in "Cost of Clean." 
In short, for all of these reasons, OIRA was wrong to continue to rely 
on the Hahn and Hird study in preparing this report. It is important to 
incorporate the wealth of newer infonnation and analyses that have become 
available since that study was published. In addition, because OIRA did not, 
in the 2001 OMB Report, repeat all of the criticisms and caveats contained 
in its previous reports regarding the Halm and Hird study, readers of the 
200 10MB Report may fail to understand how completely implausible 
OIRA's no-net-benefits scenario for environmental protection is. 
IV. CosT-BENEnT ANALYSIS 
In revealing its plan to return rules to agencies when it does not 
believe the rules are justified by the cost-benefit analysis required by 
Executive Order 12866 (2001 OMB Report at p. 40), OIRA appears to 
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signal an intention to increase the role of cost-benefit analysis in federal 
regulatory policy. This development is unfortunate. Cost-benefit analysis is 
resource-intensive and time-consuming, and at the very least requiring 
agencies to jump through every analytical hoop presented by OIRA 
threatens to delay many important agency rules. Even more problematic, 
however, is the fact that cost-benefit analysis is systematically biased against 
the very health, safety, and environmental protections that OfRA has 
expressed a special interest in reviewing (and perhaps undoing). (See 
Analytical Perspectives at 419·21 (singling out health-protective regulation 
for special attention and criticism).) 
In order to compare the pros and cons of any particular regulatory 
standard, cost-benefit analysis seeks to translate all relevant considerations 
into monetary terms. In cost-benellt analysis, therefore, both the costs of, 
say, putting a scrubber on a power plant to reduce air pollution and the 
benefits of doing so, including the saving of human lives and the prevention 
of debilitating and painful diseases, are presented in terms of dollars. The 
costs and (particular!y) the benefits of regulation often will be realized in the 
future; in such cases they are also "discounted," i.e. treated as equivalent to 
smaller amounts of money today. 
I have attached to this testimony a monograph on cost-benefit 
analysis, written by Frank Ackerman and me, which describes in detail the 
ways in which cost-benefit analysis is inherently unreliable and biased as a 
method for evaluating environmental regulatior.. (See attachment, Lisa 
Heinzerling and Frank Ackerman, "Pricing the Priceless: Cost-Benefit 
Analysis of Environmental Protection" (Georgetown Environmental Law 
and Policy Institute 2002).) Here, I briefly review our critique of cost-
ben~fit analysis. 
First, the process of reducing life, health, and the natural world to 
monetary values is inherently flawed. Efforts to value life illustrate the basic 
problems. Cost-benefit analysis implicitly equates the risk of death with 
death itself, when in fact they are quite different and should be accounted for 
separat~ly in considering the benefits of regulatory actions. Cost-benefit 
analysis also ignores the fact that citizens are concerned about risks to their 
families and others as well as themselves, ignores the fact that market 
decisions are often very different from political decisions, and ignores the 
incomparability of many different types of risks to human life. The same 
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kinds of problems arise in attempting to define in monetary terms the 
benefits of protecting human health and the environment. 
Second, the use of discounting systematically and improperly 
downgrades the importance of environmental regulation. While discounting 
makes sense in comparing alternative financial inveShnents, it cannot 
reasonably be used to make'a choice between preventing harms to present 
generations and preventing similar hanns to future generations. Nor can 
discounting reasonably be used even to make a choice between harms to the 
current generation; choosing between preventing an automobile fatality and 
a cancer death does not turn on prevailing rates of return on financial 
investments. In addition, discounting tends to trivialize long-term 
environmental risks, minimizing the very real threat our society faces from 
potential catastrophes and irreversible environmental harms, such as those 
posed by global warming and nuclear waste. 
Third, cost-benefit analysis ignores the question of who suffers as a 
result of environmental problems and, therefore, threatens to reinforce 
existing patterns of economic and social inequality. Cost-benefit analysis 
treats questions about equity as, at best, side issues, contradicting the widdy 
shared view that equity should COWlt in public policy. In fact, poor countries, 
communities, and individuals are likely to express less ''willingness to pay" 
to avoid environmental banns, simply because they have fewer resources. 
Therefore, cost-benefit analysis would justifY imposing greater 
environmental burdens on them than on their wealthier counterparts. With 
this kind of analysis, the poor get poorer. 
Finatly, cost-benefit analysis fails to produce the greater objectivity 
and transparency promised by its proponents. Cost-benefit analysis rests on 
a series of assumptions and value judgments that cannot remotely be 
described as objective. Moreover, the highly complex, resource-intensive, 
and expert-driven nature of this method makes it extremely difficult for the 
public to understand and participate in the process. Thus, in practice, cost-
benefit analysis is anything but transparent. 
Beyond these inherent flaws, cost-benefit analysis suffers from 
serious defects in practical implementation. Many benefits of public health 
and environmental protection have not been quantified and cannot easily be 
ql antified given the limits on time and resources; thus, in practice, cost-
benefit analysis is often akin to shooting in the dark. Even when the data 
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gaps are supposedly acknowledged. public discussion tends to focus on the 
misleading numeric values produced by cost-benefit analysis while relevant 
but non-monetized factors are simply ignored. Finally. the cost side of cost-
benefit analysis is frequently exaggerated. because analysts routinely fail to 
account for the economies that can be achieved through innovative efforts to 
meet new environmental standards. 
Real-world examples of cost-benefit analysis demonstrate the strange 
lengths to which this flawed method can be taken. For example. the 
consulting group Arthur D. Little, in a study for the Czech Republic, 
concluded that encouraging smoking among Czech citizens was beneficial to 
the government because it caused citizens to die earlier and thus reduced 
government expenditures on pensions, housing, and health care. In another 
study, analysts calculated the value of children'S lives saved by car seats. by 
estimating the amount of time required to fasten the seats correctly and then 
assigning a value to the time based on the mothers' actual or imputed hourly 
wage. These studies are not the work of some lunatic fringe; on the 
contrary, they apply methodologies that are perfectly conventional within 
the cost-benefit framework. 
Fortunately. there are many good alternatives to the use of cost-
benefit analysis. In fact. virtually all of the environmental protections 
adopted in the United States over the last several decades were developed 
without the use of cost-benefit analysis. Technology-based regulation. 
market-based regulation such as poIlution trading. and environmental right-
to-know programs all have reduced pollution and protected the environment 
without relying on the problematic method of cost-benefit analysis. 
Given the deep and varied flaws in cost-benefit analysis, given the 
fact that a lot of time and money are required to generate cost-benefit 
studies. and given that superior, time-tested regulatory alternatives are 
available. OJRA's apparent plan to increase reliance on cost-benefit analysis 
in evaluating environmentally protective regulation is misguided. 
V. COST-EFFECTIVENESS ANALYSIS 
The Analytical Perspectives document accompanying the budget 
unveils orRA's plan to evaluate regulations that protect public health 
through use of cost-effectiveness analysis. As OIRA puts it, its goal is to 
"deploy risk-management resources in a way that achieves the greatest 
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public health improvement for the resources available - that is the most 
'cost-effective' allocation of risk-management resources" (Analytical 
Perspectives at'p, 419). 
To this end, OIRA proposes greater reliance on what it calls "league 
tables" - tables used "to rank programs, technologies, regulations and 
therapies aimed at saving lives and improving public health" (Analytical 
Perspectives at p. 419). By way of example, OIRA provides a table 
purporting to show the cost per Iife-year-saved for ten regulations. The 
reported costs range from $0 to $1265 million (ld. at Table 24-1, p. 419), 
League tables are among the most abused props in the literature 
criticizing health, safety, and environmental protection. Because the current 
head of OIRA, John D. Graham, misused such tables in the work he did as 
the director of Harvard's Center for Risk Analysis prior to coming to OIRA, 
there is good reason to be wary of OIRA's proposal to increase the role of 
these tables in evaluating programs aimed at protecting public health. 
I critique Dr. Graham's previous work on costs per tife saved in detail 
in a forthCOming article in the journal RISK. I attach the penultimate draft 
of that article, entitled "Five-Hundred Life-Saving Interventions and Their 
Misuse in the Debate Over Regulatory Reform," to this testimony. Briefly, 
the following are the major problems with both Dr. Graham's previous work 
and OIRA's current proposal to attach more significance to costs per life 
saved in evaluating life-saving regulation. 
First, tables showing costs per life saved. including the table presented 
in the Analytical Perspectives document, employ the technique of 
discounting life-saving benefits. As noted above in Part IV, this technique. 
common to both cost-benefit and cost-effectiveness analysis as practiced by 
Dr. Graham and OIRA, misguidedly treats the welfare of future generations 
as trivial. Discounting also vastly understates the benefits of reducing 
diseases that have a long latency period, such as cancer. By employing 
discounting, league tables systematically favor health measures over safety 
measures because long-latency diseases such as cancer are often the only 
quantifiable benefits of health regulation. Thus, in most cases, the only 
health benefits included in these tables are also benefits that are discounted. 
It is no surprise, then, that OIRA concludes that safety rules tend to be more 
cost-effective than health rules (Analytical Perspectives at 420). This is a 
conclusion built into the assumptions underlying these league tables. 
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Second, tables showing costs per life (or life-year) saved fixate on 
only one benefit of programs that save lives - that is, lives saved. However, 
many Iife~saving programs do more than save lives. Environmental 
programs, in particular, have multiple benefits, only one of which is to save 
lives. Environmental programs prevent nonfatal illnesses, fatal illnesses that 
cannot be quantified (and that therefore do not figure in league tables), 
ecological harm, and the intangible but real hanns to individuals and 
communities that result from involuntary, insidious, cumulatively harmful -
exposure to toxic chemicals. League tables reflect none of these impOrtant 
benefits. Although OJRA notes that many life-saving programs have 
benefits other than saving lives (Analytical Perspectives at 420-21), in 
practice, reliance on league tables has invariably led to a fixation on lives 
saved to the exclusion of all other benefits. 
Third, OIRA's proposal to use quality-adjusted life-years saved as the 
measure of the effectiveness of life-saving programs is also problematic 
(Analytical Perspectives at 421). The upshot of this criterion is that 
_ regulatory programs that save the lives of the elderly will be deemed less 
effective than those that save the lives of the middle-aged or young, and that 
programs saving the lives of the ill or disabled will be deemed less effective 
than those saving the lives of the healthy and non-disabled. The criterion of 
quality-adjusted life-years is at odds with the concept of equality that 
underlies our constitutional system. What is more, the introduction of this 
controversial measuring rod through the obscure and opaque vehicle of 
league tables almost guarantees that there will be no public discussion of this 
important policy issue. It seems reasonable to suppose that if the ordinary 
citizen were aware of OIRA's proposal, she would not like it; imagine 
putting to a vote the question whether age and health status should be a basis 
for rationing environmental protection. 
Fourth, OIRA's construction of the league table in the Analytical 
Perspective document combined discounting and life-years in a way that is 
truly bizarre. Take OIRA's calculation of the benefits of a regulation on 
child restraints as an example. In that case, OIRA assumed that the average 
age of the people whose lives would be saved by this rule was 3 years old. 
This child has a remaining life expectancy, OlRA calculated, of 75 years. 
After discounting, OIRA concluded that a child whose life was saved by this 
rule would Jose, not 75 years of life, but only 14.3. (Analytical Perspectives 
at p. A-2.) How was this stuMing reduction in regulatory benefits made 
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possible? Although OIRA does not explain its methodology in any detail, it 
seems reasonable to conclude that OIRA proceeded by taking each life-year 
saved by the nile separately and discounting it from the year in which it will 
be lived. (This would be consistent with the methodology Dr. Graham used 
before coming to OlRA. See attachment, Lisa Heinzerling, "Five-Hundred 
Life-Saving Interventions and Their Misuse in the Debate Over Regulatory 
Reform," RISK (forthcoming 2002).) Using this approach, a 3-year-old 
child's last year of life would be discounted for 75 years, the second-to-Iast 
year of life would be discounted for 74 years, and so on. The upshot of this 
strange approach to discounting is that no one ever loses a· whole life. .' 
Moreover, given that the life-years of the young will be discounted over a 
longer period than the life-years of the old, it turns out, in OIRA's analysis, 
that the old are valued pretty much like the young after all; notice that the 3-
year-old with 75 years left to live magically becomes a person with only 
14.3 years left to live. (As another illustration of the same basic problem, 
note that the Occupational Safety and Health Administrati~n's rule limiting 
exposures to methylene chloride in the workplace was transformed from a 
rule saving 21.5 life-years for every life saved, to one saving only 2.83 life-
years, through the perverse magic of discounting. (Analytical Perspectives 
at p. A-4.» OIRA's proposed use ofleague tables to evaluate the wisdom of 
life-saving programs threatens to undennine many such programs while at 
the same time remaining completely opaque to the average citizen. 
League tables are, in short, a biased. inaccurate. and non-transparent 
way of expressing the effectiveness of life-saving regulations, particularly 
environmental regulations. As the head of Harvard's Center for Risk 
Analysis, Dr. Graham frequently invoked league tables as a way of 
criticizing health and environmental regulation, yet his criticisms reflected a 
misinterpretation of his own research. (See attachment, Lisa Heinzerling, 
"Five-Hundred Life-Saving Interventions and Their Misuse in the Debate 
Over Regulatory Reform," RISK (forthcoming 2002).) The anti-
environmental slant of Dr. Graham's previous work bodes ill for 
environmental regulations reviewed by this administration. 
CONCLUSION 
Let me conclude on a (mostly) positive note. OIRA has, in this 
administration, done more to increase the transparency of its work than any 
previous administration. One can now find, on OIRA's web page, return 
letters. prompt letters, and other documents relevant to OIRA'g-work. One 
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can also find reports of meetings with OIRA stakeholders. In some cases, 
however, these disclosures can be more frustrating than informa~ive. To 
learn. for exaritple, that top OIRA officials met with agricultural interests 
about EPA's CAFO rule a month before OIRA put that rule on its hit list 
(see report of meeting on OIRA's web page) is to be given a reason for 
suspicion about the motives for placing this rule on the hit list without being 
given enough infonnation to confirm or reject that suspicion. In order to 
overcome its history as an, office shrouded in secrecy and steeped in anti-
regulatory bias. OIRA should make every effort to broaden and deepen its 
disclosures of the bases for its deeisions. 
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